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Many socialpractices imposed upon women because we are women are not
considered by the law to be based on our sex. .

.

. Sexual harassment

has been not only legally allowed it has been legally unthinkable. As I

came to analyze it, sexualharassment also appearedneither incidentalnor
tangentialto women's inequality, but a crucial expression of it, a central
dynamic in it. Is its centrality to women's condition connected to its legal
andsocialpermissibility? In particular,i's sex discriminationlaw as constructed,by inner logic as much as by outer hmits, unable to grasp the true
dimensions of women's inequaity? Does sex discriminationdoctrine embody a conception of sexuahy, gender, andpower that can even begin to
touch theirfused reality as women experience it?
-- Catherine MacKinnon'
© Copyright 1983 by Andrew W. Haines.
t Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law 1973-1979 and 1980 to present; Visiting Professor of Law, Southwestern University Law School 1979-1980. University of Michigan, J.D. 1969; University of Minnesota, B.A. 1966; Reginald Heber Smith
Fellow 1969-1971.
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If there will bejusti'ce in the world to come, women will be law givers and
men have to have babies.
2
-Bertha Pappenheim
I.

INTRODUCTION

When the authors of the Declaration of Independence declared
that "all men are created equal," they introduced to the consciousness of this nation an ideal that has constantly placed moral demands on all citizens who hear and use these words. While the
authors neither intended to eradicate slavery nor eliminate racial
discrimination, they did provide moral authority for those persons
who would later seek to make equality a reality for all. The bright
promise of the Declaration of Independence became the rallying
cry of the abolitionists and the Radical Republicans who eventually captured its spirit in the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of
"equal protection of the laws." Importantly, the latter group
translated the concepts of justice and equality, through the guarantee of "equal protection of the laws," into a "relational concept"
of equal employment opportunity. The equal protection clause
was reinforced in the form of equal employment opportunity
through the enactment of the employment sections of the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts, 3 which, to some extent, put to flight
the nineteenth century notion of "freedom of contract."'4 Never2. Bertha Pappenheim was the immortal Anna 0. in Sigmund Freud's mental
health case histories, playing an important role in the development of psychoanalysis. She
later became a famous figure in her own right as a feminist, playwright, and humanitarian. Bertha made this statement near the end of her life, which included numerous
battles against sexism.
3. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, reenactedin Act of May 31, 1870,
ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 144 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976)); Civil Rights Act of
1871, ch. 22, §§ 1-2, 17 Stat. 13 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3) (Supp. IV
1980)).
4. For a discussion of this concept, see Klare,Judictal Deradtahzaizon of the Wagner Act
and the O'g4ins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 293-98 &
nn.94-100 (1978). The author discusses this concept in the following passage:
Although contrary emphases on social control had never been excluded from the
law of contracts, in the nineteenth century, freedom of contract doctrine reshaped and revised that law so as to provide a framework for protecting expectations and facilitating transactions deemed essential or desirable from the
standpoint of the emerging capitalist order. In the spirit of laissez faire, the doctrine extolled the social virtue of uncompelled private-ordering of most transactions: the right of private citizens to establish the legal incidents and standards
governing most of their relationships.
Id. at 295 (footnotes omitted).
Continuing, the author adds these points:
The underlying philosophical assumptions of the freedom of contract doctrine parallel those that characterize the classical liberal political tradition,
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theless, the astute chroniclers of history note an important fact
about this relational concept during the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries: the proponents of this concept espoused it only for
white and black males. In essence, this relational concept of equal
employment opportunity origznaled in a climate of sexism.
Indeed, one must travel well into the sixth decade of the twentieth century to observe a concerted federal effort to translate
"equal protection of the law" into the ancillary concept of equal
employment opportunity for women. 5 Similarly, one must travel
well into the seventh decade of the twentieth century to observe a
concerted Minnesota effort to translate this same concept through
the enactment of amendments 6 to the Minnesota Human Rights
7
Act (the Minnesota Act).
One finds the above facts noteworthy; they indicate that
America had acknowledged sexism that resulted in denied access
to employment long before America sought to extirpate this social
namely, that all values are arbitrary, subjective, and personal; that society is an
artificial aggregation of autonomous individuals who come together solely for
the instrumental purpose of maximizing personal satisfactions; that the state
should do no more than facilitate the orderly quest for such satisfactions; and
that, because values are arbitrary and subjective, only the concurrence, actual or
constructive, of individual desires can provide standards of ethical obligation.
Id. at 295 n.95 (citations omitted).
The author then explains one of the underlying explanations for the jettison of the policy
of freedom of contract:
Since its appearance a century or more ago, the moral and social policy of
freedom of contract has been assailed by critics who regard as its chief vice the
fact that the substantive content of private-ordering reflects the gross disparities
of economic power characteristic of capitalist society. In this view, freedom of
contract is, in practice, an institutional framework for the legitimate exercise of
coercive power. The amount of freedom created by the system of freedom of
contract depends on the structure of economic power, yet differences of economic
or class power are ordinarily either ignored or regarded as legitimate in contractualist jurisprudence, particularly in its late nineteenth- and early twentiety-century conceptualist version. The tendency of freedom of contract doctrine has
been to treat as naturally preordained an historically contingent system of class
relations.
Id. at 296-97 (citations omitted).
5. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, 78 Stat. 241, 253 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
6. See, e.g., Act of May 21, 1973, ch. 507, § 23, 1873 Minn. Laws 1120, 1139 (amending MINN. STAT. § 43.15 (1971)) (introduced prohibition against discrimination based on
age, race, sex, or disability in civil service).
7. See Act of Apr. 19, 1955, ch. 516, 1955 Minn. Laws 802 (current version at MINN.
STAT. ch. 363 (1982)). For an analysis of the history and framework of the pre-existing
statute, see Auerbach, The 1969 Amendments to the Minnesota State Act Against Discrimination
and the Uniform Law Commissioner's [sic] Model Anti-DiscriminationAct.- A Comparative Analsis
and Evaluation, 55 MINN. L. REV. 259 (1970); Auerbach, The 1967 Amendments to the Ahnnesota State Act Against Discrimination and the Uniform Law Commissioners' Model Anti-Discrimination Act." A Comparative Analysis and Evaluation, 52 MINN. L. REV. 231 (1967).
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sickness. Sexism probably confronts America with sociological
and psychological complexities that dwarf the problem of racism.
For this reason, one can understand why America has only recently statutorily recognized one of the last important frontiers of
gender-based employment discrimination: sexual harassment.
While administrative agencies and courts have interpreted the various federal and state equal employment opportunity statutes to
cover a variety of gender-based employment discrimination over
the last fifteen to twenty years, these same agencies and courts are
only now interpreting-and quite begrudgingly in the instance of
several courts-these statutes to cover sexual harassment in the
workplace.
This Article will examine the first sexual harassment case8 decided by the Minnesota Supreme Court and the subsequent 1982
amendment 9 to the Minnesota Act proscribing sexual harassment.
To do so, the Article will consider the answered and unanswered
questions about sexual harassment arising from the Continental Can
Co. v. State decision and will explore the contours of sexual harassment under the amended Minnesota Act. The Article will also
explore the contours of sexual harassment under the Minnesota
Act within the larger context of "equal protection of the law" and
its ancillary concept of equal employment opportunity for women.
For this reason, the Article begins its analysis with a consideration
of the concept of equal employment opportunity for women and
an examination of the jurisprudential complexities that arise in defining sexual harassment in the context of equal employment
opportunity.
II.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE CONCEPT OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY FOR WOMEN

American society continually struggles to theoretically and prac-

tically render equality for its citizenry by eliminating and preventing certain artificial and unnecessary social inequalities.' 0 Indeed,
8. Continental Can Co. v. State, 297 N.W.2d 241 (Minn. 1980).
9. See Act of Mar. 23, 1982, ch. 619, §§ 2-3, 1982 Minn. Laws 1508, 1511 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 363.01(10), (10a) (1982)).
10. For a very illuminating discussion of the role of equality, see E. BODENHEIMER,
POWER, LAW, AND SOCIETY 133-34 (1973). Bodenheimer stated the quest in the following

manner:
The truly critical problem posed to legal and social policy is not to extirpate all
forms of inequality, but to segregate irrational and arbitrary categories of differentiation from reasonable and constructive schemes and to eliminate or reduce
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our Anglo-American political theory demonstrates that the individual's and the society's well-being is a function of the society's
ability to achieve this equality. This social well-being depends on
differentiating reasonable and socially constructive behavior that
promotes equalityfrom irrational and socially destructive behavior
that undergirds the objectionable inequality within grand political
and economic designs.
Society's achievement of this differentiation is intellectually, economically, psychologically, and practically very difficult, as this
harsh social reality illustrates: society pursues only a "limited
equality" for individuals or groups by retaining, and even legally
protecting, those inequalities (both natural and artificial) deemed
necessary for preserving and furthering various indispensable individual and societal interests. For example, American society permits employment decisions based on natural talents and abilities
as well as decisions based on "bona fide" seniority systems. American society has had difficulty achieving this constructive differentiation for another reason: the dominant male group has had great
psychological difficulty, and hence occasional lapses in willpower,
in overcoming its penchants for racism and sexism. America's beatification of equality, especially for oppressed individuals, has appeared as a "social illusion" for black people and women. The
resultant legal treatment-the various omissions and comissionsrepresents major examples of America's social callousness and, accordingly, the serious disjunction between America's ideology and
idealism and its social practice. To a small extent, the society rectified part of the problem with the passage of the various constitutional provisions and civil rights acts during the late nineteenth
century; however, the major efforts to rectify the problem, on the
part of the federal and state governments, did not come until several decades into the twentieth century with the passage of the
various unfair discriminatory practices statutes. America has unevenly identified and responded to the various demands for equality, thereby bringing them within the moral injunction of the
Declaration of Independence and making the differentiation between constructive and destructive social behavior even more of a
faint hope than without the lethargic historical advances discussed
above.
the former ones. It will always be necessary to preserve those inequalities which
are indispensable to the effective discharge of social function.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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But once American society has surmounted its psychological
barriers and identified its dispensable inequalities, how has it accomplished its goal of equal employment opportunity under the
various federal and state laws? To travel from the transcendent
theoretical plane into the heart of social action, American jurisprudence has developed several "social constructs" for achieving this
"limited equality." One such construct is that of equal employment opportunity (EEO). Tersely stated, the EEO construct is an
equation that first identifies various societal interests, and then, using a "social calculus," weighs the respective interests within a
given employment context. This social equation combines various
jurisprudential notions of equality that defend the employment
rights of the protected class, and then applies a "social calculus"
that balances these employment rights against other competing individual and social interests via "standards of equilibrium."" In
turn, this entire conceptual complex is installed within various federal and state constitutions, federal civil rights statutes, and state
unfair discriminatory practices statutes-in this instance the Minnesota Act-thereby creating a sensitive, finely tuned gauge for
differentiating rational from irrational employment behavior that
affects the protected classes of persons. For present purposes, the
Article focuses only on the notion of equality for women, leaving
for another time a consideration of how this overarching concept
of EEO-this complicated plexus of sub-ideas that synergistically
achieves the desired end product of equal access-actually
functions.
The general societal notion of equality (as well as that of justice)
subsumed within a varietal concept of EEO is itself a very complicated body of ideas. In fact, the societally derived notion of equality possesses a "polymorphous character,"' 12 particularly at this
11. This discussion represents the author's own statement of the concept of equal employment opportunity. Owing to space limitations, the backdrop of this very important
legal concept is not fully developed here.
12. See, e.g., E. BODENHEIMER, supra note 9, at 128. Bodenheimer demonstrates the

polymorphous character of equality by listing these "five basic kinds of equality
configurations":
(a) equality of rule classifications; (b) commutative equality; (c) equal treatment
of equals; (d) equality of fundamental rights; (e) equality of need satisfaction.
These five categories by no means exhaust the wide variety of patterns that may

be encountered in social attempts to deal with the problem; they merely represent broadly-defined ways of approach to a solution.
Id.; see also

J.

TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 19 (1965) (describing three definitions of

equality-"one-for-one," the "natural rights," and the "classification" definitions); G.
SARTORI, DEMOCRATIC THEORY 334 (1967) ("We must now cease to speak of equality in
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juncture in American legal history. Hence, equality clearly denotes more than "equal treatment" for individuals or groups-if
that phrase can even make much sense with reference to some protected persons (e.g., "handicapped" persons) without further elaboration. Owing to the confluence of these complicated ideas about
equality and the complicated social needs of the various classes of
protected persons, our eventual idea of equality for a given class of
persons is a composition of "equal treatment," "equality of needs,"
"equality of fundamental rights," and "commutative equality."
Accordingly, this composite statement of equality translates into
the following: Within the ancillary concept of EEO, equality requires the creation of a fundamental employment right for the
protected class members and a mandate that employers provide
equal treatment and reasonable accommodation of the employment setting for the various protected class members. The concept
also includes a mandate of commutative justice in the redistribution of societal goods, services, and wealth to eliminate the previous maldistribution and disproportionate injury to the protected
class members. In addition, since the concept of EEO amounts to
a social equation that factors in a variety of societal interests when
society strives to achieve equality, the following interests also find
their places within the construct: the employer's constructive
schemes for differentiating among applicants and employees; the
employment rights of individuals not within the protected classes
(co-workers or co-job applicants); the employees' right of collective
bargaining; the health and safety of the society; and the various
views about how society defines the term "reasonableness" when
used in balancing the numerous competing interests in a given employment setting.
Plainly, as the opening quote indicates, the concept of EEO for
women cannot help extirpate sexual harassment in the workplace
without the law's constant examination of the cornerstone of the
concept: the notion of equality for women under the law. Administrative agencies and courts must be ready to adjust the notion of
equality to the subtleties and complexities of sexual harassment on
the job. These bodies-if they are to do justice to women-cannot
adopt only a truncated idea of "equal treatment" when conthe singular and proceed to deal with equalities in the plural."); Wilkerson, The Supreme
Court, the EqualProtection Clause, and the Three Faces of ConstitutionalEquality, 61 VA. L. REv.
945,946 (1975) (constitutional equality subdivided into "(1) political equality, (2) equality
of opportunity, and (3) economic equality").
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fronting sexual harassment in the workplace; they cannot hold
back the tide of legal reasoning with reference to the notion of
equality. Hence, one can easily see-if one reflects on the above
discussion-that the modern concept of equality, with its involved
composition, can encompass the varieties of sexual harassment in
the workplace without great difficulty. For example, the notion of
''equal treatment" can be applied to find unequal treatment where
an employer allows harassment of females by male employees but
forbids harassment of males by female employees; the notion of
"equality of needs" lends itself to application where the law wants
to find that an employer that permits its male employees to create
harmful work conditions through sexual harassment for the employer's female employees fails to recognize the female employees'
special need for protection against the males' powerful combination of social and economic dominance.
The failure to extend the concept of equality, and therefore the
concept of EEO, to extirpate the irrational and socially destructive
employment behavior of sexual harassment does not reside in the
inelasticity of the concept of equality. The failure to extend the
concept probably comes from the myopic willingness of male lawyers and judges to view harassing sexual behavior simply as isolated, innocuous, interpersonal disagreements between men and
women, unconnected to the job and not within the employer's responsibility of controlling the work environment. This view disingenuously removes the employer from the pale of the moral
injunction of equality by holding that the employer's failure to
control a personal intersexual dispute on the job is not a denial of
equal employment opportunity for women. In fact such a view
masks the exploitation of men's economic dominance over women.
This regrettable and probably subconscience recalcitrance toward
EEO for women compels close examination of an important subject: the "employment consequences" of sexual harassment or the
nexus between a particular instance of sexually harassing behavior
and the subject female's employment. "Employment consequences" serve as the touchstonet 3 that elevates sexually harassing
behavior above the level of a purely personal act for which neither
the employer nor the involved male employee should be chal13. Nonetheless, one could take the position that any sexual behavior that a male
directs toward a female in the workplace, irrespective of any "employment consequences,"
has the "aura" of intimidation and exploitation of social and economic dominance, so that
the law ought to prohibit all sexual behavior that males direct toward females in the
workplace to protect against any subtle intimidation, exploitation, and denial of respect
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lenged under the various equal employment opportunity statutes.
A female employee may encounter conceptual problems when she
tries to extend the concept of equality to reach work-related sexual
*behavior viewed as harmless and natural in the eyes of a majority
of persons. Yet, "employment consequences" should not be permitted to take an unduly narrow meaning. To maintain the integrity of the concept of equality, we should not interpret
"employment consequences" to mean simply economic losses resulting from sexual harassment. Owing to the sometimes subtle
nature of sexual harassment, women may suffer "employment consequences" of an intangible nature that are as worthy of rectification as any tangible economic detriment. A work environment
saturated with intimidation may not immediately lead to a demotion, job termination, salary loss, or the like, but is nevertheless a
deprivation of equal employment opportunity.
This was the jurisprudential background that faced the Minnesota Supreme Court as it examined the issues in Conltnental. The
various parties called on the court to determine whether the employer had engaged in socially constructive or destructive employment behavior, within the framework of the concept of EEO for
women. While the commendable job of the Continental court in
advancing the employment equality of women was fortified by the
1982 amendment to the Minnesota Act, one cannot avoid the
supreme irony: Some two hundred years after the Declaration of
Independence, our society still struggles to achieve equality in the
workplace for a large segment of our population. Any sense of social advancement must be tempered by the soberness that comes
from the recognition that our system of justice arrived only yesterday to address sexual harassment, though it started out on the
journey over two centuries ago.
for female personhood. In sum, all sexual behavior that males direct toward females in
the workplace ought to be "harassment" for social policy reasons.
The notion of "employment consequences" becomes the gauge for our EEO statutes
because such an element permits us to identify socially destructive behavior that our concept of EEO ought to prohibit. Indeed, if our society dismisses the notion of "employment
consequences" to embrace all sexual behavior in the workplace, our law assumes an overly
intrusive quality and imposes such a stringent burden on employers that the law seems
totalitarian and hence begins to lose its binding capabilities. Moreover, one can argue
that the EEO statutes ought to concern themselves with significantly
work-related sexual
behavior, admitting that the law should liberally interpret "employment consequences."
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THE DEFINITION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Since society's concern now centers around identifying socially
destructive behavior that denies women equality in the workplace,
we naturally turn to the task of defining one type of this behavior:
sexual harassment. Given our primal concern of equality in the
workplace, how should our legal machinery define sexual harassment? The long opening quote demonstrates that a threshold step
in this definitional process is the willingness to denominate some
sexual behavior in the workplace according to the behavior's true
character; sexual behavior that harasses women to the point of denying them equal access to employment should be denominated
sexual harassment. Yet, how should the legal machinery determine when certain sexual behavior amounts to "harassment"?
What gives the sexual behavior its harassing character? Several
persons have attempted to define "sexual harassment. 1 4 This Article will examine three of these definitions. The first definition
starts from a broad socio-economic base, providing a general
analytic:
Sexual harassment, most broadly defined, refers to the unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the context of a
relationship of unequal power. Central to the concept is the
use of power derived from one social sphere to lever benefits or
impose deprivations in another. The major dynamic is best expressed as the reciprocal enforcement of two inequalities.
When one is sexual, the other material, the cumulative sanction
is particularly potent.' 5
The second definition introduces greater specificity than the
first: "Sexual harassment is any unwanted physical or emotional
contact between workers or supervisors and workers, which makes
one uncomfortable and/or interferes with the recipients [sic] job
performance or carries with it either an implicit or explicit threat
of adverse employment consequences.' 6 The third definition also
introduces specificity and, like the second, provides an operational
definition: "Sexual harassment is any repeated or unwarranted
verbal or physical sexual advances, sexually-explicit derogatory
14. See, e.g., Unemployment Compensation Benefits for the
assment, 3 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 173 n.1 (1980).
15.

'ctnim of Work-Related Sexual Har-

C. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 1.

16. Sexual Harassmentin the FederalGovernment: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Investigations of the House Committee or Post Ofte and Civil Service, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 113 (1979)
(statement of Kenneth T. Blaylock, National President of the American Federation of
Government Employees).
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statements, or sexually discriminatory remarks made by someone
in the workplace which is offensive or objectionable to the recipient or which causes the recipient discomfort or humiliation or
7
which interferes with the recipient's job performance."'
Importantly, all of the definitions highlight the complex interaction of biological behavior with social behavior, leaving one, however, with the impression that, in the final analysis, sexual
harassment centers primarily around socio-economic behavior.1 8
These definitions help us to perceive that sexual harassment is not
solely and purely sexually motivated behavior on the part of men;
it is more clearly an acting out of the socio-economic tensions and
hostilities of the male, as well as a manifestation of larger social
stereotypes and entrenched mythologies. For example, rather than
being the product of an uncontrollable biological urge, sexual harassment may be conduct that reflects an image of superiority and
dominance, a perceived incompetence and powerlessness in the
face of a female's competence and potential for acquiring greater
power, or the tension and hostility that males have toward females
who do not fit the social stereotype-that is, the idealized sex object who is submissive, responsive, and not in competition with the
dominant male. ' 9
If one desires, one can classify these definitions into two general
patterns of sexual harassment on the job: the quidpro quo pattern
and the condition of work pattern. 20 In the first pattern, the male
premises the demand for sexual compliance on the promise of an
employment opportunity. Behind the demand/promise lies the
threat of penalties for failure to comply, such as unfavorable job
evaluations, demotions, transfers, denial of pay increases, or termination. In the condition of work pattern, the female encounters a
work environment permeated with sexual offense, intimidation,
and abuse. Here the exchange of sexual favors for employment
opportunities may be indirect or nonexistent.
These two patterns help us understand both why such employment behaviors are socially destructive not simply in terms of their
17. Brief Amici Curiae of the National Organization for Women and Working Women's Institute at 15-16, Continental Can Co. v. State, 297 N.W.2d 241 (Minn. 1980).
18. See C. MAcKINNON, supra note 1, at 1-7.
19. The author first read this interpretation in a paper submitted by Carole Harper
for my employment discrimination seminar.
20. See C. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 32.
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role in the denial of "social primary goods" 21 in the sense of rights,
but also in the denial of the "social primary good" of women's selfrespect-and why a host of "critical questions" arise about when
sexual behavior that males direct toward females in the employment setting actually becomes socially destructive within our concept of EEO. The quid pro quo pattern underscores the usual
concatenation between the sexual behavior, the female's response,
and any employment consequences, so that we focus all attention
on the social damage and how we can reestablish the integrity of
the female and the workplace. On the other hand, the condition of
work pattern draws our attention to the possibility that the sexual
behavior is not harassment and that the female's response is simply
an overreaction, or to put it another way, the sexual behavior, the
female's response, and the job are unconnected, so that a particular instance of sexual behavior is not socially destructive within a
given employment context via our concept of EEO for women.
Accordingly, with respect to this second understanding, we start
asking the following types of questions:
Where is the line between a sexual advance and a friendly gesture? How actively must the issue be forced? If a woman complies, should the legal consequences be different than if she
refuses? Given the attendant risks, how explicitly must a woman reject? Might quitting be treated the same as firing under
certain circumstances? To get legal relief, must a job benefit be
shown to be merited independent of a sexual bargain, or is the
situation an injury in itself? When a perpetrator insists that a
series of touchings were not meant to be sexual, but the victim
experienced them as unambiguously sexual, assuming both are

equally credible, whose interpretation22 controls when the victim's employment status is damaged?
Our hope is that the answer to these questions will, in this moment
of uncertainty, give us more confidence in our judgments and
hence, in our use of the concept of EEO.
In conclusion, this discussion provides some insight into the
character of the legal definition of sexual harassment in the workplace. One should sense both the ease and difficulty of this definitional process, given the possible range of sexual behavior on the
job. Moreover, one should also appreciate that given the need for
a probing and careful analysis of this wide range of social behav21. See J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 92 (1971). One should especially examine
Rawls' discussion of the social primary goal of self-respect. See id.at 440.
22. See C. MACKINNON, supra note 1,at 31.
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ior, many observers will not probe deeply enough to uncover the
more subtle forms of sexual harassment. Hence, the working
defintion of sexual harassment, in some instances, will ultimately
23
depend on the thoroughness and sophistication of the analyzer.
IV.

THE COURT'S ANALYSIS IN CONTINENTAL

Having laid the foundation for analysis, the Article now turns to
the case decided by the Minnesota Supreme Court before sexual
harassment was explicitly prohibited by the Minnesota Act. Willie Ruth Hawkins, a black female, was one of two females (the
other white) who worked at one of Continental's plants. Shortly
after Hawkins began working in December 1974, she and the other
female were the subjects of "explict sexually derogatory remarks
and verbal sexual advances" 24 from three male Continental employees, with occasional offensive touching by one of the males.
The two women complained to their supervisor in March of 1975,
though neither woman identified the harassers. Continental took
no action in response to the complaints. The offensive remarks
and touching continued, culminating in a more serious incident on
October 13, 1975. On that occasion, one of the male workers approached Hawkins from behind and grabbed her between her legs
as she performed her work. Hawkins immediately complained to
Continental's plant manager but again Continental neither took
immediate action to investigate the complaint nor did it stem the
25

harassment.

Owing to the highly offensive character of the sexual grabbing
incident, Hawkins' husband entered the picture seeking to protect
his wife. He confronted the harasser in the Continental parking
lot after work hours. This action prompted further intimidation of
Hawkins. Continental's plant manager did reprimand Hawkin's
harasser for the parking lot confrontation. The plant manager
later informed police of the increasing level of tension and the possibility of violence. The plant manager then discovered that Hawkins had filed a criminal complaint against one of the harassers,
since this man had confronted Hawkins at her home threatening
her with a gun. One of Continental's supervisors later learned
23. For an excellent illustration of this point, see Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934
(D.C. Cir. 1981).
24. Continental Can Co. v. State, 297 N.W.2d 241, 244 (Minn. 1980).
25. Id.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1984

13

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 3 [1984], Art. 4
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8

about the gun incident from the harasser. 26
During October 1975, the Hawkins family held a series of meetings with representatives of Continental. Hawkins was asked to
return to work but she refused, claiming that the company gave no
assurances for her safety. Later in October, Continental suspended two of the harassers, the man who grabbed Hawkins and
the man who assaulted her, largely because of pressure from black
community groups. Finally near the end of October, Continental
initiated a formal company investigation, during which Continental disseminated its policy against verbal or physical harassment
and discrimination. Continental fired Hawkins in December 1975
27
after she refused to return to work.
Before the termination, Hawkins had filed a discrimination
charge with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights against
Continental and the plant manager, alleging sexual discrimination
with respect to work conditions in violation of the Minnesota Act.
The Department found probable cause to believe that a violation
of the statute occurred, and filed a lawsuit against Continental and
the supervisor after unsuccessful conciliation. Following a hearing,
a hearing examiner concluded that only Continental committed
unfair discriminatory employment practices and that Continental
had constructively discharged Hawkins. The hearing examiner
awarded back pay damages, but reduced these because he attributed responsibility for the tension at the plant to Hawkins' husband and racial discrimination. Although the hearing examiner
denied punitive damages and job reinstatement, he ordered Continental to cease and desist from discrimination based on sex in
28
work conditions.
Continental appealed the decision to district court; the Department cross-filed and Hawkins intervened. The district court reversed the decision and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.
The Department appealed the district court's decision to the Minnesota Supreme Court. The supreme court reversed the district
29
court's decision.
While the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed five issues 30 in
its decision, only two of those issues are important for understand26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
Id. at 244-45.
Id. at 245.
Id.
Id.
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ing the contours of sexual harassment under the Minnesota Act as
it existed at that time: first, when does verbal and physical sexual
harassment become sex discrimination in an employment setting,
and second, whether Continental committed an unfair discriminatory employment practice under the statute. 3' The reader can
note that neither issue alone nor the two issues taken together indicate the direction of the court's opinion. One must examine the
opinion to understand why the supreme court reversed the district
court.
With respect to the first issue, the Minnesota court turned to the
cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to obtain
direction in analyzing this case of first impression. The court first
noted that a majority of federal courts have held that sexual harassment does constitute sex discrimination; 32 however, the court
noted that Continental did not factually resemble those cases, since
the employer in Continental had not tried to make the woman's sex
a term or condition of employment. 33 Further, the court noted
that the various federal courts did not agree on the theory of the
employer's liability for actions of supervisory personnel. 34 While
some courts require a form of notice to the employer coupled with
a failure to undertake remedial action, others automatically impose responsibility based on vicarious liability. The court did not
explicitly note its opinion on this disagreement; however, the court
did implicitly voice its position by its reference to a couple of racial
harassment cases which the court believed more closely resembled
Contt'nental.35 Importantly, the two racial harassment cases the
court cited illustrate that liability attaches only "where the employer knows or should know of the condition and permits it to
continue without attempting to 'discourage' it."' 36
For further guidance on what constitutes sexual harassment, the
court relied on the then-interim sexual harassment guidelines of
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 37 The
court noted that those guidelines very broadly defined sexual harassment: any conduct of a sexual nature that interferes with an
31. The court broadly stated the issue. In actuality the question was whether Continental exculpated itself by an adequate and timely response to the complaint of Hawkins.
32. 297 N.W.2d at 246.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 247.
35. Id. at 247-48.
36. Id. at 247.
37. Id. at 248. The Final Guidelines were published at 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676 (1980).
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individual's work performance or that creates an unhealthy work
environment is within sexual harassment, not simply the demand
that sexual conduct become a condition of employment. 3 Furthermore, the court noted that those guidelines stated that liability
attaches for acts of agents and supervisory employees regardless of
whether the employer authorized or prohibited the challenged acts
and regardless of whether the employer knew or should have
known of their occurrence and that liability attaches for acts of coemployees when an employer knew or should have known about
such misconduct.

39

In light of the case law and interim guidelines, the court gave its
own interpretation of sexual harassment, keeping in mind that the
facts before it did not resemble the typical sexual harassment case.
The court noted that while an employment action premised on
"dispensation of sexual favors" obviously smacks of a differential
treatment based on sex, and is easily recognized as such, an employment action that demands that a female adapt herself to a
workplace in which males direct other "repeated unwelcome sexually derogatory remarks and sexually motivated physical contact" 40 is no less invidious and disparate treatment. Such
treatment confronts female employees with working conditions different from those faced by male employees. Accordingly, the court
held that the then-existent statutory 4' prohibition against sex discrimination "includes sexual harassment which impacts on the
conditions of employment when the employer knew or should
have known of the employee's conduct alleged to constitute sexual
42
harassment and fails to make timely and appropriate action."
On the issue of whether Continental, as the employer of the harassers, committed an unfair discriminatory employment practice
under the Minnesota Act, the court relied on its own analysis of
the facts. First, the court found that the remarks Hawkins initially
complained about in March 1975 represented verbal sexual harassment, while the "sexual grabbing" incident represented physical sexual harassment. 43 Second, the court addressed the
disagreement between the hearing examiner and district court
about whether Continental properly investigated and curtailed the
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

297 N.W.2d at 248.
Id.
Id.
MINN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 1(2)(d) (1980).
297 N.W.2d at 249 (footnote omitted).
Id.
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sexual harassment after Hawkins' notification. The hearing examiner divided the time period and found that Continental violated
the statute by failing to investigate the complaints and take affirmative action to remedy the behavior 4 during the period of March
to October 13, 1975. The examiner then concluded that Continental again violated the statute after October 13, 1975 because it
did not immediately investigate Hawkins' complaint and did not
take prompt action to stem the harassing behavior. 45 The district
court concluded that Continental could not investigate a claim
when Hawkins withheld the harassers' names durbig the March to
October 13, 1975 period 46 and that Continental did take appropri47
ate action after October 13, 1975.

The supreme court sided with the hearing examiner. As the
court stated about the pre-October 13, 1975 conduct:
We appreciate the fact that without the harassers' identities,
Continental's options were limited. However, Continental took
no action whatsoever. Even without the harassers' identities,
Continental could have disseminated an anti-harassment policy
to its employees as did the employer in Bell v. St. Regis Paper Co.,
425 F. Supp. 1126 (N.D. Ohio 1976) when faced with com48
plaints about unidentified harassers.

Further, the court stated that as to the post-October 13, 1975 conduct, the question it faced was determining the point at which
"Continental's duty to act was activated-before or after the parking lot and gun confrontations. '49 The hearing examiner concluded that Continental had a duty to act the same day Hawkins
complained about the grabbing conduct or shortly thereafter. The
supreme court agreed that the second violation turned on Continental's failure to act promptly.5 0 As the court noted about this
violation:
The essence of the second unfair discriminatory practice lies not
in the inadequacy of Continental's later responses to the situation
but instead on the fact that these responses were not timely.
This failure to respond promptly to Hawkins' complaints regarding the grabbing incident "connected" Continental to the
act of sexual harassment perpetrated by its employee on Octo44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 250.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ber 13, 1975. 5 1
Hence, the court found that Continental failed to take timely action during the important post-October 13, 1975 period.
V.

THE 1982 SEXUAL HARASSMENT AMENDMENT TO THE
MINNESOTA ACT

Partly in response to Continental and largely because of the pervasiveness and seriousness of sexual harassment in the workplace,
the Minnesota legislature amended the Minnesota Act in 1982 to
prohibit sex-based discrimination in the form of sexual harassment
discrimination. 52 The legislature amended the statute by making
two changes. First, the statutory definition of the word "discriminate" was expanded to include sexual harassment for purposes of
discrimination

based on sex. 53

"sexual harassment":

Second, the legislature defined

"Sexual harassment" includes unwelcome sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors, sexually motivated physical contact
or other verbal or physical conduct or communication of a sexual nature when:
(1) submission to that conduct or communication is made a
term or condition, either explicitly or implicitly, of obtaining
employment ....

;

(2) submission to or rejection of that conduct or communication by an individual is used as a factor in decisions affecting
that individual's employment . . . ; or

(3) that conduct or communication has the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with an individual's employment . . . or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive

employment environment; and in the case of employment, the
employer knows or should know of the existence of the harass54
ment and fails to take timely and appropriate action.
VI.

ANSWERED QUESTIONS ABOUT EMPLOYMENT SEXUAL
HARASSMENT CLAIMS

Having examined the Continental opinion and having introduced
the 1982 amendment to the Minnesota Act, one can ask what they
tell us about the claim of sexual harassment in Minnesota? Con51. Id. at 250-51 (emphasis added).
52. Act of Mar. 23, 1982, ch. 619, §§ 2-3, 1982 Minn. Laws 1508, 1511 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 363.10(10), (10a) (1982)).
53. Id. § 2, 1982 Minn. Laws at 1511 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 363.01(10) (1982)).
54. Id. § 3, 1982 Minn. Laws at 1511 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 363.01(10a) (1982)).
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tinuing the format developed above, the Article will examine the
questions that have been answered that relate to the issue of when
verbal and physical sexual harassment become sex discrimination
in an employment setting. An important threshold question now
answered is how Minnesota defines sexual harassment. Clearly,
any definition must separate noncognizable, personal sexual overtures, or friendly gestures, from cognizable sexual harassment.
The Continental court adopted and the Minnesota legislature enacted the broad view of the EEOC: sexual conduct becomes harassment when it constitutes "[u]nwelcome sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct or
communication of a sexual nature." 55 Both bodies obviously saw
merit in the broad EEOC definition, which itself comes close to
the operational definition the Article sets forth above, rather than
trying to create a very narrow judicial or legislative definition.
In addition to the above, any definition of sexual harassment
must secondarily separate noncognizable, personal sexual overtures from cognizable, job-related sexual harassment. Here too the
court and legislature indicated their refusal to adopt a narrow concept of sexual harassment. When the court noted that many Title
VII sexual harassment cases seemed "factually distinguishable"
from the Continental facts, the court was merely indicating that it
would not demand that a sexual harassment claim fit the quidpro
quo pattern to be cognizable under the Minnesota Act. In a sense,
the court announced that it viewed sexual harassment as a more
complicated notion than, for example, the notion of racial harassment. Some sexual harassments fit the quidpro quo pattern, while
other sexual harassments fit the condition ofwork pattern that courts
have generally encountered in the race context. Hence, both the
court and legislature took a broad approach on the nexus of the
sexual harassment to the given employment. They adopted that
part of the EEOC's sexual harassment definition that tells us when
the unwarranted sexual conduct connects up with the job so that
we can begin fairly examining the employer's liability: Employer
conduct becomes sexual harassment when the employee must submit to it as a condition of her employment; when submission to
such conduct becomes the basis of employment decisions affecting
the employee; or, when such conduct "has the purpose or effect of
substantially interfering" with the employee's work or "creating an
55. 45 Fed. Reg. 25,025 (1980) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1982)).
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intimidating, hostile, or offensive" work environment. 56
A second important question now answered is what theory is to
be used for visiting liability on an employer when some of the employer's workers engage in the sexual harassment of a female
worker. Like the EEOC, the court and the legislature attached
liability based on the employer's actual and constructive knowledge
of the misconduct, leaving the employer with the defense of demonstrating that it undertook timely remedial action. 57 The legislature's enactment of the language from the EEOC guidelines leaves
so little doubt that the answer to this question does not require
further analysis.
Beyond these important questions about when sexual harassment becomes employment discrimination, two other questions
have been answered. In response to how one determines whether
actionable sexual harassment exists in a given case, the court outlined a procedure that calls for close examination of the facts surrounding the incident, the notice to the employer, and the nature
of the employer's reaction. One can safely argue that this suggested procedure simply states the obvious, without providing
much insight. If one seeks greater insight than the court's opinion
supplies, then one must closely examine the EEOC guidelines
which the court incorporated by reference.
Both the court and legislature also addressed the important
question of whether the employer has a duty to maintain a "discrimination free" work atmosphere. 58 The question arose in Continental because of the conclusion of the hearing examiner that the
pre-amendment statute imposed "a duty on an employer to maintain a working environment free from discriminatory insults, intimidation and harassment." 59 In response, however, the court
indicated that the hearing examiner placed too onerous a burden
on the employer: "In our view, the Act does not impose a duty on
the employer to maintain a pristine working environment. '" 6° According to the court, the employer only need take timely, remedial
action upon notice that one worker is sexually harassing another
worker. Taking an approach nearer to that of the hearing exam56. Id. (quoted in Continental, 297 N.W.2d at 248). As codified, the word "substantially" was replaced by the word "unreasonably." See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a) (1982).
57. 297 N.W.2d at 249.
58. See id. But see infra note 62 (discussion of possible confusion this language can
cause).
59. 297 N.W.2d at 249.
60. Id. (emphasis added).
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iner, the legislature prohibited unwelcomed sexual conduct that
creates an intimidating, hostile or offensive employment environment. 6' In short, the amended Minnesota Act clearly places a
duty on the employer to control the often subtly intimidating or
sometimes blatantly hostile work atmosphere that frequently attends sexual harassment. An employer cannot simply adopt a reactive posture; the employer must affirmatively act to avoid or
eliminate the "climate of sexual harassment."
Turning to the issue of whether Continental committed an unfair discriminatory employment practice under the Minnesota
Act, the court affirmatively answered the question of whether the
employer has a duty to investigate when notified by an employee
that she is being sexually harassed by co-workers, 6 2 and that this
duty is triggered even though the notifying employee fails to name
the harassers. Silence, inaction, and passivity in the face of notification amounts to the employer's complicity and hence liability.
The legislature did not depart from this position. Equally important, in answering the question about the character or nature of
the employer's response, both the court and the legislature noted
that the employer's action must beprompt-not just a response after
events escalate to a crisis as they did in Contlinental-andadequateas the court indicated in referring to the adequacy of the employer's response in Howardv. NationalCash Register Co. ,63 where the
employer, in response to notification of racial harassment, transferred the complainant to another shift, held frequent meetings to
discuss the problem, disseminated an anti-harassment policy to all
employees, and undertook disciplinary action against the
harassers. 64
Finally, the court indicated how it viewed the discriminatee's
conduct throughout the harassment, particularly whether quitting
61. MINN. STAT. § 363.01, subd. 10a(3) (1982)).
62. In Note, Sexual Harassment n the Workplace. Title Vll's Imperfect Rehif, 6.J. CORP. L.
625, 644 (1981), the author indicates that Continental lends itself, with help from Bundy v.
Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981), to a determination that the employer is liable for
sexual harassment committed by fellow employees under Title VII, although no federal
court case has so expressly held.
Beyond the above, Continental clearly indicates that under the Minnesota Act, the
employer can be liable for co-worker sexual harassment regardless of the presence of the
Bundy analytical foundation. The Minnesota Supreme Court relies on the precedential
base of the Title VII racial harassment cases, as does the above-cited Note. See Note,
supra, at 644.
63. 388 F. Supp. 603 (S.D. Ohio 1975).
64. See id. at 605.
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might be a "discharge" under certain circumstances. The court
first demanded that the discriminatee notify the employer of the
co-worker's harassment to activate the employer's duty to investigate. The court did not, however, demand that an employee await
protection from an obviously dilatory employer. The court announced that it would use the concept of "constructive discharge" 6 5 to equate quitting, under certain circumstances, with
termination. To be expected, the legislature did not address what
is a judicial creation.
VII.

UNANSWERED QUESTIONS ABOUT EMPLOYMENT SEXUAL
HARASSMENT CLAIMS

While we should analyze the Continental decision and the 1982
amendments for the questions they have answered to learn about
sexual harassment claims in Minnesota, we should likewise consider questions left unanswered. An important unanswered question is how the court and legislature will view a claim of sexual
harassment allegedly creating a "harmful work environment"
where the claimant does not assert tangible "employment consequences," such as a termination, non-promotion, or undesirable
transfer. Continental did not present such a set of facts in its final
form, even though Hawkins did raise this question initially when
she filed her charge on October 20, 1975, after her refusal to return
to work in late October but before her termination on December
5, 1975. 66 The court probably concluded that it did not need to
address such a question given the final shape of the facts, although
the court partially addressed the issue when it decided that the
"Act does not impose a duty on the employer to maintain a pris'67
tine working environment.
Yet, Hawkins' initial question is important. Many women want
to know whether certain sexual behavior is sexual harassment and
hence sex discrimination with respect to the terms and conditions
of employment, irrespective of whether the woman loses tangible
job benefits. Indeed, if the notion that sexual harassment can create a "harmful employment atmosphere" is to have any meaning,
the discriminatee should be able to end the sex discrimination
before it results in tangible employment losses. Should not the notion lead a court to grant preliminary relief to a claimant before
65. 297 N.W.2d at 251.
66. See id. at 245.
67. Id. at 249.
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the loss of tangible job benefits? The recent opinion from the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Bundy v. Jackson 68 a Title VII case, indicated that logic does lead us to find sex
discrimination and a basis for injunctive relief when the victim of
harassment has not lost tangible job benefits. As the Bundy court
noted,
[Aln employer could sexually harass a female employee with
impunity by carefully stopping short of firing the employee or
taking any other tangible actions against her in response to her
resistance, thereby creating the impression-the one received
by the District Court in this case-that the employer did not
'6 9
take the ritual of harassment and resistance "seriously."

The Bundy court continued its analysis with this observation about
ignoring the logic of its opinion:
The employer can thus implicitly and effectively make the
employee's endurance of sexual intimidation a "condition" of
her employment. The woman then faces a "cruel trilemma."
She can endure the harassment. She can attempt to oppose it,
with little hope of success, either legal or practical, but with
every prospect of making the job even less tolerable for her. Or
she can leave her job, with little hope of legal relief and the
likely prospect of another job where she will face harassment
anew. 70

While one has to look to the logic of the Continental opinion to
conclude that the Minnesota Supreme Court has implied a right
to injunctive relief (in effect the Buny approach) in cases of sexual
harassment not resulting in loss of tangible employment benefits,
one can look to the language of the 1982 amendment to conclude
that sexual discrimination occurs even when a discriminatee has
not lost tangible job benefits. 7' The statutory reference to sexual
68. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981). For a discussion of this case, see Note, supra note
57, at 635.
69. 641 F.2d at 945. The Bundy court relied heavily on the previous analysis of the
federal court in Rogers v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 454 F.2d 234 (5th
Cir. 1971), cert. denzed, 406 U.S. 957 (1972). See 641 F.2d at 944-45.
70. Id. at 946 (footnote omitted).
71. See Note, supra note 62, at 644. But see 297 N.W.2d at 249 (employer has no duty
to maintain "pristine" working environment). The author of this student note argues that
the Continental opinion "allowed the court to hold the employer liable for the coworkers'
actions even though the plaintiff suffered no tangible economic employment consequences
as a direct result of the harassment." Id. The author argues that the "employer's failure
to take prompt steps to curtail the harassment constructively discharged the plaintiff." Id.
at 644 n.169. The Note stretches the ContTnental facts to fit its analysis.
The sexual harassment by the co-workers directly led to the constructive discharge.
When the co-workers created the environment of sexual harassment, they caused Hawkins
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behavior that has the "effect of substantially interfering with an
individual's employment . . .or creating an intimidating, hostile
or offensive employment . . . environment" 72 easily leads to the

Bund -type analysis. If the Minnesota Act prohibits sexual harassment that prevents an employee from performing her job and that
creates a climate of discrimination, one can argue that an employee need not suffer some further tangible employment consequence such as a termination or demotion. In sum, the statute
imposes a duty on the employer to protect the employee's intangible
employment rights through, namely, the creation of a right to
have the sexual harassment obstacles removed from the path to an
acceptable job performance and the right to a non-offensive work
environment.
Another important but unanswered question is what theory of
liability is appropriate when an employer's agents or supervisors
rather than employees are the source of conduct alleged to constitute sexual harassment. The Continental court expressly reserved
to demand that Continental protect her. However, Hawkins had already removed herself
from the job by the time of this demand. See 297 N.W.2d at 244. Further, what if the
sexual harassment interfered with the ability of Hawkins to make her production quota,
because of which she would lose compensation? Moreover, owing to the nature of the
sexual harassment at the time of Hawkins' last day on the job, one could argue that the
harassment discouraged Hawkins' return to work even ifContinental had given assurances
of protection. Hence, Continental's failure to act did not serve as the only causal agent
that led to Hawkins' loss of tangible economic employment consequences; this failure to
act served as a second causal agent in the sense of another agent helping cause a second set
of losses, and it worked in tandem with the harassment to cause the constructive discharge.
Consequently, the Note is correct only if one ignores the realities of Continental.
Putting aside the question of the constructive discharge because of a failure to
promptly act, and assuming that the employee seeks injunctive relief before the occurrence
of some tangible economic employment consequences, does the language in Continental
pose an analytical hurdle for the employee making a sexual discrimination claim in the
Bundy manner? Only on the surface does this Continental language pose a problem. If one
reads the court's language carefully one concludes that the court allows for the Bund
scenario and the resultant claim of sexual harassment even if immediate economic losses
do not occur. The court states that the employer has a duty to act promptly and adequately whenever it knows or should know about sexual harassment in the workplace.
What the court states is that it refuses to impose an "abstract duty" to maintain a nondiscriminatory work environment separate from a duty to respond to announced discrimination or discrimination about which the employer ought to know. In essence, an employee
cannot get relief simply because the employer failed to keep the environment free of discrimination; rather, the employee must canalize its action down the notification channel,
or she must argue that the notification was precluded because the nature of the facts
indicate that the employer ought to have known about the harassment. Accordingly, the
Continental opinion leaves ample room for the Bundy analysis; it creates a duty to respond
triggered by the discriminatee, without the discriminatee's having to prove resistance to
the harassment or that the resistance caused tangible economic losses.
72. MINN. STAT. § 363.01, subd. 10a(3) (1982).
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this question; 73 the legislature took no position beyond imposing
liability for actual and constructive knowledge of the misconduct. 74 Nonetheless, the answer is far from a mystery. In light of
the great deference the court and legislature have given the EEOC
guidelines, one can expect the court to follow the lead of the
EEOC which provides that an employer is responsible for the sexually harassing behavior of its agents and supervisory employees
regardless of the employer's authorization, prohibition or knowledge of the acts complained of. 75 Indeed, one does not find other
logic compelling. Imposing a notice requirement on the claimant
ignores the tradition of imputing knowledge to and hence responsibility on the employer when its agents or supervisors-those functionaries that employers deem synonymous with managementengage in sexual harassment. Requiring notice also ignores the
logical and practical difficulties of compelling the employee to
search throughout the organization (what if a "web of conspiracy"
exists?) for other agents or supervisors who will both entertain a
complaint and undertake an investigation.
A related question left unanswered is whether the employer
should be liable for sexual harassment by customers or other unaffiliated persons on the same basis that the employer assumes liability for such conduct if its agents, supervisors, or employees harass a
worker. The final EEOC guidelines do address the subject by
holding employers responsible for actions of "non-employees" who
sexually harass employees "where the employer (or its agents or
supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action. ' 76 These guidelines demonstrate that the Conlihental court's
73. See 297 N.W.2d at 249 n.5.
74. MINN. STAT. § 363.01(10a) (1982).
75. The EEOC guidelines state the point as follows:
(c) Applying general Title VII principles, an employer, employment
agency, joint apprenticeship committee or labor organization (hereinafter collectively referred to as "employer") is responsible for its acts and those of its agents
and supervisory employees with respect to sexual harassment regardless of
whether the specific acts complained of were authorized or even forbidden by
the employer and regardless of whether the employer knew or should have
known of their occurrence. The Commission will examine the circumstances of
the particular employment relationship and the job junctions [sic] performed by
the individual in determining whether an individual acts in either a supervisory
or agency capacity.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (c) (1982).
76. Id. § 1604.11 (e). The extent of the employer's control over and legal responsibility for the conduct of the non-employee are also considered in assessing the employer's
liability. Id.
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logic and the amendment's language should easily lead to the imposition of liability for actions of third parties. Hence, one can
safely conclude that both Continental and the 1982 amendment
spread the blanket of Title VII protection even to this point.
Still a further unanswered question is whether an employer's
nondiscriminatory policy-in particular, an anti-harassment policy-insulates the employer from charges of sexual harassment
even when an agent or supervisor has engaged in the harassing
behavior. By the tone and direction of the Continental opinion, one
can conclude that the court adopts the position of Miller v. Bank of
America ,7 where the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
employer violated Title VII by permitting sexual harassment on
the part of one supervisor that breached established company policy. 78 If the employee gives notice of harassment by co-workers, or
if the harassment originates with agents or supervisors, and the
employer fails to undertake a prompt and adequate response, the
logic of Continental imposes liability on the employer, regardless of
the employer's promulgated nondiscrimination policy. Continental
calls for remedial action, not inaction insulated by a disseminated
nondiscrimination policy.
A final unanswered question 79 is whether sexual harassment of a
male, or sexual harassment by a bisexual of both a male and female, comes within the court's reasoning and the 1982 amendment. The Contihental court's discussion about disparate treatment
of female employees provides reasoning for the instance of sexual
harassment of a male by a female, provided the female does not
sexually harass a female at the same time; the "disparate treatment" analysis works equally well for either sex. This logic does not
smoothly work, however, when one introduces the bisexual problem, as several earlier Title VII sexual harassment cases indi77. 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
78. Id. at 213.
79. After initially reading Continental, some employers may be concerned about the
vagueness of the court's opinion. For example, some employers may be uncertain over the
standard they should use to determine whether conduct is offensive and to whom. What is
an employer's responsibility in the instance of hypersensitive victims? If the employer is
aware that co-workers have a personal relationship and allows such, is the employer
chargeable with notice if the relationship changes and one party's conduct can become
sexual harassment? The author holds that employers can answer these and other like
questions by closely examining the EEOC guidelines and the Title VII cases that the
Continental opinion cites.
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cated.8 0 Nonetheless, to bring this situation within the command
of the law one can rely on the broad sweep of the 1982 amendment
language of "unwelcome sexual advances,""' coupled with the approach of the Bundy court that "sex discrimination within the
meaning of Title VII is not limited to disparate treatment founded
solely or categorically on gender. Rather, discrimination is sex discrimination whenever sex is for no legitimate reason a substantial
factor in the discrimination. 8' 2 While the Cont'nental court's logic
arguably leaves room for the Bundy reasoning in the instance of the
bisexual problem, the court's heavy reliance on the "disparate
treatment" analysis does not clearly lead to the Bundy position.
Hence, the 1982 amendment with Bundy is a stronger foundation
for extending statutory coverage to the bisexual discrimination
problem.
VIII.

FINAL REFLECTIONS ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND

THE CONCEPT OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
FOR WOMEN

Several questions about sexual harassment and its deeper significance for the concept of equality for women remain. Did the Minnesota legislature actually take the proper course by amending the
Minnesota Act to prohibit sexual harassment in the workplace?
Did the legislature fairly serve the interests of female workers and
the myriad employers with the logical compromises manifest in
the enactment? Realizing that uncertainty in state employment
practices discourages capital formation and deployment vital to
the economic life of the state, did the legislature and court go beyond the necessary diminution of incentives and prerogatives normally implicit within all EEO statutes to establish a sexual
harassment cause of action in the Minnesota Act? Finally, should
the Minnesota legislature amend the Minnesota Act to provide
any clearer protection for the interests of employers?
In Continental, the Minnesota Supreme Court followed a course
started several hundred years ago. While the analyses discussed
above have appeared only recently, the foundations for the embracing concept of EEO for women go far back in our history. In
point of fact, addressing questions about the permissibility of sex80. See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Williams v. Saxbe,
413 F. Supp. 654, 659 n.6 (D.D.C. 1976).
81. MINN. STAT. 363.01 (10a) (1982).
82. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d at 92.
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ual behavior within the employment setting represents one in a
long line of concerns about equality in the workplace for women
and one of the last major frontiers in women's struggle for equality
in the workplace. Now that the coverage of the concept of EEO
for women has been broadened, an employer's indulgence in or
countenance of sexual harassment in the workplace unquestionably falls within the sphere of socially destructive behavior that the
Minnesota concept of EEO for women prohibits, leaving no doubt
that his behavior cannot conceivably be furthering important employment interests, or that such behavior is a "frolic" for which the
employer should be exonerated and for which employees should be
forgiven with the sheepish retort that "boys will be boys." Yes,
Continental and the amended Minnesota Act reaffirm the social
policy of providing equality in the workplace for women and retaining integrity for the statutory concept of EEO; and the case
and subsequent legislation signal that the Minnesota Supreme
Court and the Minnesota legislature do not perceive an overriding
social policy that militates in favor of protecting the economic interests of employers by denying the legal existence of a sexual harassment claim. Like an idea whose trajectory we only now
perceive though its launching predated these lives in being, these
83
recent developments have had this monumental impact.
The court and legislature also acknowledged that marking the
perimeters of equality in the workplace can, at times, pose troublesome intellectual problems for the concept of EEO for women and,
hence, for society. We must understand that both the Continental
court and the 1982 amendment have provided only limited insight, relying heavily on the EEOC guidelines and the developed
Title VII notions of racial harassment for analyzing the praxis of
sexual harassment under the Minnesota Act, even then compelling
us to go beyond this body of ideas to develop a further analytic to
examine the praxis of sexual harassment within the employment
context. For the present, however, we must accept the valiant efforts of the Minnesota Supreme Court and Minnesota legislature,
replete with the unanswered questions. After all, Minnesota has
proved Bertha Pappenheim partially incorrect by pushing the idea
83. See, e.g., Peterson, Sex harassment case attracts attention, suits, Minneapolis Star, June
11, 1981, at 1A (referring to impact Continental has had on consciousness of women workers
and employers and impact it has had on resolution of subsequent sexual harassment employment claims); see also Roedler, Sexual harassment--Complaints soar as women find law an
ally, St. Paul Dispatch, Dec. 16, 1981, at 14A.
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of justice and equality through another frontier to enforce the
moral injunction of the Declaration of Independence.
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